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Abstract: This paper examines the persistent food shortages in the island of Crete under Venetian rule
(1204–1669) through the prism of the monetary system of Venetian territories and in combination with
the other economic policies of the Venetian empire. From the available sources and analysis, it seems
that the policies of Venice which prioritised the food security of the metropolis, the financial support
to the elites, and the elite-favouring monetary and taxation system were contradictory and self-
defeating. In particular, the monetary structure of the colonial economy and the taxation system seem
to have been forcing both Cretans and Venetian settlers to produce wine for export instead of grain
despite the repeated food shortages. The parallel circulation of various high-value (white money)
and low-value (black money) currencies in the same economy and the insistence of the Venetian
administration to receive taxes in white money seems to have been consistently undermining the
food security policy adopted by the same authorities. The paper contributes to the discussion of
how parallel currencies can stabilise an economy or can create structural destabilisation propensities,
depending on coeval economic structures that usually go unexamined when we examine monetary
instruments.
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1. Introduction
This paper belongs to a greater ongoing research project which investigates the mon-
etary policies of imperial Venice in one of its colonies, Crete island. The project started
in 2013, and it was not initially focusing on food security issues but only on monetary
phenomena in Medieval and Renaissance Crete island. However, the problem of food
shortages in Crete is one of the major findings thus far, and it seems to be linked one way
or another to monetary and taxation policies along with the policies of Venice concerning
grain production and food security.
Crete island is situated in the centre of the Eastern Mediterranean Sea and is one of
the major islands of the entire region with a very mild and diversified climate. Therefore, it
has both the environmental and the geopolitical conditions not to falter in food production
either through local production or through regional trade, unless, of course, there is such
a disaster that affects the entire region. Moreover, the Venetians who ruled the island for
more than 400 years undertook active policies to support and increase grain production,
but it seems that they did not achieve the results they expected.
The paper attempts to formulate a first hypothesis on the problem of food shortages
in the island, taking into account this favourable condition; why has this island faced
this food provision problem for centuries despite the efforts by the Venetian rulers to
create food security in the island? It is probable that the monetary system imposed on the
island by the Venetian Republic along with its taxation and grain policies were driving
the island economy away from any adequate food production, ending up at the clear
defeat of the grain policy of the authorities and at serious food provision problems for the
island. In other words, the economic system was forcing the local producers to produce
for exports through monoculture, and this affected the production diversity as well as the
entire landscape and the land uses of the island.
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The next section describes the food shortages problem, and Section 3 describes the
monetary system of Venice. Section 4 explains how this monetary system was functioning in
colonial Crete in combination with the taxation system imposed by the Venetians. Section 5
explains the grain policy of Venice and the (often contradictory) decisions concerning grain
production and provision in the island. Section 6 discusses in detail the research hypothesis
concerning how the economic structures of Medieval Crete led to persistent food insecurity,
and Section 7 presents the conclusions and the directions for further research.
2. An Unexpected Finding: Food Shortages in the Island that Can Have Anything
The research on the monetary policies of imperial Venice was not initially designed to
address issues of food production and food security. There is indeed a later stage where
the modes of production and the prices of various goods and services will be explored, but
the main scope of the project at this initial stage has been to understand how the monetary
system of Venice was functioning in one of its main colonies, Crete island.
There are various limitations to my research at this stage, such as the fact that I have
not had yet the chance to do research in Italy. However, since the beginning, the problem
of food shortages in Crete island during late Middle Ages and Renaissance has been
mentioned in various sources, even if the papers or books are not focusing on this question.
Most of the authors do not even pay much attention to the “famines” or the “hunger”
they mention. They easily mention a crop failure or a war incident in an area where Crete
imports grain from, and this is usually the only reference they give in the text (Detorakis
1994, p. 201). Other authors mention the efforts of the Venetian rulers to encourage grain
production, sometimes with rather obligatory rules that prohibit other types of cultivation,
and how the Cretans were not abiding with the policies that aspired to bring diversion of
the local agriculture to grain (Gasparis 1994).
We examine the food security policies of the Venetans in Crete in more detail in
Section 5. At this stage, we need to note that the failure of Venetian authorities to implement
their grain policy is striking. First because, as rulers, they have been quite harsh with the
local habitants, the colonised Cretans. The Cretan people revolted many times against
Venice, sometimes taking to their side the Venetian settlers as well (what would make
a Venetian settler turn against its own metropolis?). To be unable to implement such a
simple policy while being an authoritarian regime in the island means that it was not as
simple as it seems and that there were structural problems or resistances that were linked
to structural problems.
The failure of food security policies is even more striking because Crete island, due to
its geographical and climatic conditions, is supposedly one of those favoured areas where
food is the last thing to be missing. Crete does not necessarily have the continental climate
to produce vast amounts of grain, nor did it have the best climate to produce the vast
amounts of wine that it did produce for centuries. It has, however, some highland plains
where the climate is ideal for wheat and other grain species, and the production could have
been enough, in theory, to feed the population of the island.
Moreover, Crete at the time of Venetian rule was not as populated as it is today.
Estimates show that the major cities of the island (Chania, Rethymno, Handax/Herakleion,
Siteia) at the time could not have had more than 10,000 inhabitants each and likely even
fewer than that. The countryside was even more sparsely populated to the point that
the Venetians had to bring settlers of various ethnic origins to the island in order to
make sure that they had enough labour to work in the fields or in other production
sectors (Gasparis 1994). The last Venetian census of 1644 shows that the population of
Crete was 257,066 people (cited by Stallsmith 2007), which is fewer than half of today’s
population of the island. The 2011 census showed that Crete has 623,065 habitants (Region
of Crete 2021). Therefore, the local needs for food did not seem to exceed the productive
capacities of the land.
Crete seemed to be able to export grain at some point of time, and in other times,
it was a net importer or a permanent importer (Tsougarakis 1990; Stallsmith 2007). It is
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not possible to have a clear picture of how much grain in total the island could produce.
It is normal that the total production varied given that the Venetian rule in Crete lasted
more than four centuries. As we see in Section 5, the sources partially reflect the quantities
of grain, given that we can only know the quantities traded, as those are reflected in
contracts. Of course, as Tsougarakis states, exporting does not mean that Crete had a
surplus of grain nor does importing mean that Crete had a deficit of grain production.
Exports and imports of grain, therefore, need to be examined along with other political and
economic conditions instead of being taken for granted or connected to linear explanations
about the local quantity of grain production. The important thing is that Crete island was
also very capable of exporting and importing grain because it is situated at a point in
the Mediterranean Sea that facilitates trade. This means that geopolitical conditions of
Crete could be anything but isolating and commercially marginalising its island economy
(Maltezou 1997; Pallastri 2005; Thiriet 1961; Williamson 2002).
Even a bad weather incident is not enough to explain the persistence of the food
shortages as a permanent problem in Crete. For example, a bad weather condition for one
or a couple of years would make Crete dependent on imports. It might also make people
(producers and/or authorities) reconsider their agricultural activities so that they can face
weather instability in a better way. For example, more production could be an option.
Experimenting with producing in new areas or by using new methods could be another
option. However, what is not explainable is that the problem seems to have persisted for
centuries, no matter what the weather is, no matter whether there is war or not on the
Mediterranean coasts, and no matter how hard the Venetian authorities try to persuade the
locals to cultivate more grain.
In other words, we have references for lack of adequate quantities of grain in Crete
during various times of the Venetian rule. We also have sources that mention the tough
control of Venice over the trade of grain, both internal and external. We discuss the debate
about whether the grain sector was completely state-directed or a market in the next
sections. We also have references for grain imports, which sometimes had to be done from
areas under Ottoman rule, with which the Venetians had ambivalent relationships.
Irrespective of the policies of the Venetian authorities, it is also important to mention
that the local people who were actually the ones to bear the consequences of the food
shortages were not so prone to cultivate grain or other food staples. Quite the opposite,
they seemingly preferred to deny to conform with the official policies and cultivate other
species, such as grapes for wine, although they knew that, in case of famine, they would be
in danger themselves. The persistence of food shortages would make anyone expect that
the Cretans would have the social or the historical experience to cultivate at least enough
for themselves to survive in times of hardship, especially if the policies of the authorities
seemed to fail. A failure of the state to provide food would mean individual or perhaps
collective provision decisions. Why would Cretans opt for behaving as if the food shortages
were the least probable, although they were persistent?
3. The Greater Economic Framework: The Venetian Monetary System
The Medieval and the Renaissance monetary systems in the Mediterranean coasts
and in the European continent in general are characterized by a multiplicity of monetary
instruments that circulate and are used on local and international levels of the economy of
the region. The same state can issue various series of currencies without always taking out
of circulation the old ones. In most areas, foreign currencies were often accepted as legal
tender, e.g., for payments towards the authorities.
This variety of monetary instruments permitted various distinctions among them,
and each categorization led to different groupings of the currencies that go beyond our
contemporary criteria for understanding a monetary system. In the same economy, whether
local or regional, we could see foreign and local currencies circulating together or even
used at the very same time to calculate the value of a transaction or the main payments of
a loan. The distinction between legal and non-legal tender meant that authorities could
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also accept foreign currencies as a means of tax or fine payments. Authorities could also,
such as in the case of Crete, compromise to use in their account currencies of the previous
empire which ruled the island (Eastern Roman Byzantine hyperpyron currency). The above
coincided with the existence of both minted and virtual currencies in the same economy,
which means that accounts could be done in a different currency than the one in which
the payment was made in the first place. Currencies that were literally minted might be
used as virtual units of account in a transaction without ever being transferred from one
party of the contract to another (Antoniadi 1967; Bacharach 1994; Stahl 2016, 1985, 2000,
2007; Travaini 2006, 2007; Tucci 2001; Drakakis and Kleanthis 2004; Liata 1996, pp. 13–82,
119–69; Mazarakis 2004; Papadaki 2000; Ploumidis 1972, 2006; Tsiknakis 2005; Mueller
1980; Spufford 2014; Cipolla 1954; Spufford 1988, pp. 122–288; Sotiropoulou 2018a).
Within this context, one should add fake, forged, or illegally minted currencies. Those
could have been forged by individuals or even by local lords or competitor states that
wanted to reduce the coins of the other states in the market or reduce the trust to their
rivals’ currencies. Forgery of currency and fake coins of all types were all over the place.
As if this was not enough of a problem, even the assigned authorities proceeded with
debasement of their own currency, adding to the complexity and the lack of confidence in
the monetary system (Chilosi and Oliver; Stahl 2000; Liata 1996, pp. 171–98; Drakakis and
Kleanthis 2004; Ploumidis 2006; Mueller 1980; Spufford 2014).
A major distinction in this very complex monetary situation is the one between gold
and silver themselves and between precious (gold and silver) and non-precious metals
(copper and/or other mixed alloys). The currencies were distinguished in two major
categories: low value currencies and high value currencies. The low value currencies could
be virtual or physically minted, and they could contain no silver or low percentage of
silver, which caused their oxidation and their dark colours; this is why they were called the
generic term, “black money”. The high value currencies could also be virtual or physically
minted, but they contained high percentage of high-quality silver or gold, or, in the case of
the virtual version, they were imagined to contain this precious metal. Because the high
value currencies did not lose or were not perceived to lose their metallic brightness, they
were called “white money” (Stahl 1985, 2000; Drakakis and Kleanthis 2004; Ploumidis 2006;
Hocquet 1979; Mazarakis 2004; Mueller 1980; Spufford 2014).
In practical terms, white money, as high value money, was used in big transactions,
such as trade (especially international/overseas trade) and wages of highly skilled labour.
Black money, on the other hand, given that its value was low, was used in small transactions
and was the currency type preferred for everyday life activities of the majority of the
people (Stahl 2000, 2007; Mazarakis 2004; Liata 1996; Spufford 2014; Mueller 1980; Lane
and Reinhold 1985; Cipolla 1954).
Venice, for several centuries, had no “white money” as such and adopted the silver
grosso in about 1194, i.e., about ten years before Venice became a Mediterranean Empire
having colonies from the Italian mainland to Istanbul, Crete, and Cyprus and various trade
points all over the Mediterranean Sea. About 90 years (1284) after the adoption of the silver
grosso, i.e., the first white currency of Venice, the Venetian authorities adopted the golden
ducato. The ducato was a coin with high quality golden metal which was never debased
and was issued/minted until the end of Venice as a separate state. Apart from the silver
grosso and the golden ducato and their various issuance series, the Venetian monetary
system had also other currencies, physically minted or virtually circulating. All of them
were of lesser value and were containing no or very small quantities of precious metal (i.e.,
silver). Most of them were regularly debased or abandoned by the Venetian authorities
and their instability of value and trust of the public was in contrast with the stability of
fineness and value of the precious-metal-based currencies, particularly the ducato (Travaini
2006, 2007; Papadopoli-Aldobrandini 1871, 1893; Stahl 2016, 1985, 2000, 2007; Drakakis and
Kleanthis 2004; Mazarakis 2004; Mueller 1980; Spufford 2014; Chilosi and Oliver; Lane and
Reinhold 1985; Spufford 1988, pp. 265–338).
J. Risk Financial Manag. 2021, 14, 151 5 of 15
4. The Local Economic Framework: Cretan Currencies and Taxation under
Venetian Rule
Crete became officially a Venetian colony in 1204 during the Fourth Crusade, and
Venice acquired practical control of the island in 1211 after war with Genova. Venetians
held the control of the island until 1645, when Chania was conquered by the Ottomans.
However, Venice retained control of Candia/Herakleion and its suburbs until 1669 during
the so-called Cretan war or the War of Candia, which was a siege of the city by the
Ottomans. In reality, the Venetian rule of Crete coincides exactly with the transition period
between Middle Ages and Modern era, i.e., between feudal system and capitalist economic
structures in Western Europe (Detorakis 1994, pp. 143–244; Norwich 1989, pp. 542–60).
A major economic and monetary problem in colonial Crete (and not only in Crete) was
lack of liquidity, i.e., lack of adequate monetary instruments in an economy to perform the
transactions the people who live in this economy want to perform. Moreover, the public
treasuries in both Venice and Crete were lacking funds, which coincided with general
shortages of monetary liquidity. That meant that the people did not have enough monetary
instruments to perform the transactions they wanted and, at the same time, they could not
pay their taxes. Debt to the public treasuries accumulated just like the public debt itself
for Venice and its colonies (Thiriet 1985; Tucci 1981, 2001; Antoniadi 1967; Drakakis and
Kleanthis 2004; Mazarakis 2004; Ploumidis 2006; Hocquet 1979).
It is indicative of the needs of the Cretan economy for currency that the false coins
circulating in the island are many and the Venetian authorities try to take them out of
circulation or at least to raise awareness about them and exchange them with genuine
coins. In 1603, for example, the fake coins in Crete collected by the Venetian authorities
corresponded to the value of 600,000 ducati, 140,000 of which were found in the public
coffers. During the first half of the 17th century, the Venetian authorities tried to inject
new coins and increased amounts of money in Crete. It seems, though, that the coins were
not enough, either because the exchange rate with ducato currency was not favourable to
the low value currencies that were released to the market or because the latter (low value
currencies) exited the island through currency trade to be used in other Venetian markets
in which the exchange rates were more profitable, such as in Corfu island (Drakakis and
Kleanthis 2004).
The question about liquidity is important because, in Crete, when the Venetians took
over the administration, there were already other currencies, of which the prevailing one
was the Eastern Roman Imperial (Byzantine) yperpyron (υπέρπυρoν). At the time the
Venetians took effective control of Crete, the yperpyron seemed not to circulate physi-
cally at all in the island but rather in virtual form, e.g., as an accounting unit. Venetians
accepted that accounting, contracts, and taxes were calculated in yperpyra, even when
the ducato was introduced by the Venetian state. Yperpyron, in particular after 1453,
was a currency of an Empire that did not exist anymore but persisted in Cretan transac-
tions until the mid-17th century, despite the introduction of ducati and the dissolution of
the Eastern Roman Empire/Byzantium two centuries earlier (Antoniadi 1967; Pallastri
2005; Papadopoli-Aldobrandini 1871; Stahl 1985; Kalitsounakis 1928; Xanthoudides 1912;
Tsiknakis 2005; Sotiropoulou 2018a).
All currencies circulating in the eastern Mediterranean had varying and floating
exchange rates among them. Even the golden ducato, which had a constant amount of pure
gold and was never debased, had variances in value and redemption power throughout
the centuries that it was used (Antoniadi 1967; Stahl 2000, pp. 147–79, 212–16; Drakakis
and Kleanthis 2004; Liata 1996, pp. 139–66; Spufford 2014; Sotiropoulou 2018a; Munro
1983).
In addition, not all transactions were usually done with all types of currencies. It
seems that certain sectors of production or trade preferred to transact with certain types of
currencies (of both high and low value). The aforementioned major distinction between
white and black money concerning the volume of transactions is just a general rule. It
seems that the variety of currencies represented also a variety of production sectors, of
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positions in production and distribution processes, and of transaction patterns (Pallastri
2005; Stahl 2007; Liata 1996; Maltezou 1985; Mueller 1980; Baroutsos 1999; Panagiotopoulou
1974; Spufford 2014; Lane and Reinhold 1985).
Despite the issuance/minting of currencies of various levels of value and precious-
metal base, the authorities who issue them are not so much into accepting all of them as
means of payment for taxes and fines. The Venetian state prefers to be paid in white money,
that is, in golden or silver coins of fine metal. That makes white money the legal tender of
this monetary system, even if, in various cases, the white money is a virtual accounting unit
on the basis of which the physical low value currencies are counted for tax purposes. In
other words, even if no white money is physically paid, the exchange rates between white
(golden or silver) money and low value currencies are always in favour of the Venetian
state (Stahl 2000; Drakakis and Kleanthis 2004; Mazarakis 2004; Mueller 1980; Cipolla 1954;
Munro 1983; Spufford 1988, pp. 265–88, 319–77).
As a consequence, the monetary segregation of sectors (and possibly of classes, pro-
fessions or guilds, genders, and ethnic and religious groups) is directly linked to the state
monetary policies. If the state prefers the white money for tax payments, those who own
it are favoured, and those who do not have to pay in other currencies at an unfavourable
exchange rate (Mazarakis 2004; Mueller 1980; Sotiropoulou 2018b). All imperial subjects
need to make sure that they have available white money to pay taxes at the end of the
financial year. If taxes are paid in white money, people tend prefer to receive payments in
this type of currency for her/his trade (but this is not an absolute rule, see Sotiropoulou
2018a). If this is not possible, they need to find large quantities of the debased low value
currencies to compensate for the exchange rates of white money currencies when need be.
5. The Food Policy of Venice in Crete: A Historical Example of Contradictions
If one wants to start examining the food shortages in Crete and what the Venetian
rulers did about them, they will see that the food shortages experienced in Crete, particu-
larly since the late 14th century onwards, historically coincided with the expansion of the
use of the golden ducato currency and with the increase of food prices in general, not only
in Crete but in the entire Mediterranean. The prices seem to have been free to fluctuate,
and in that way, prices in the island had disparities among various localities. For example,
in 1271, 100 mouzouria of wheat could have a price ranging from 6.25 to 14.2 yperpyra.
In 1300, the same quantity (100 mouzouria) had a price ranging from 11 to 25 yperpyra.
In 1361, 100 mouzouria had a price of 27 yperpyra, but in 1363, the price fell to 23.8 and
25 yperpyra. In 1399, the price of the same quantity of wheat ranged from 20 to 35 yperpyra
(Tsougarakis 1990).
Although modern economics would suggest that a rise in food prices would attract
more food producers, it seems that, despite the price increase, the island was producing
mostly wine for exports plus other products such as sugar (Tsougarakis 1990; Detorakis
1994, pp. 198–201; Moody and Oliver 2004, pp. 103–18; Ploumidis 1972; Tsiknakis 2005;
Bacharach 1994; Maltezou 1997).
As it has been mentioned previously, Crete was not a major producer of grain due to
climate reasons, but it had adequate territories to cover the needs of the local population,
especially plains that were on the highlands and that had adequate temperatures for
efficient grain production. It seems, however, that the policies of Venice concerning both
the food security of the metropolis and the financial support of the elites were self-defeating
when combined together.
In particular, Venice required that grain be produced in Crete and traded to the
metropolis at prices that were set by the Venetian authorities to make sure that the metropo-
lis did not have to face food shortages. The system of grain price setting by authorities
was complicated, but its main feature was that people who produced grain, whether they
were powerful feudal lords or small producers, did not have many opportunities for profit
in this sector (Stallsmith 2007). The grain sector was heavily controlled by the state au-
thorities, and you needed special licenses to transfer grain, even from one point of Crete
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island to the other, and much more to transport grain outside the island (Gasparis 1991;
Tsougarakis 1990).
We should add to this framework the fact that Venice itself, despite being very close
to grain producing areas, was also facing famines now and then, despite its political
power in the Italian mainland and despite its even greater economic power (Norwich
1989, pp. 449–63). It is also necessary to remind that transport was expensive, and luxury
goods were those that would bring profit despite the transport costs. To the contrary,
only when prices were quite high for food (e.g., there was lack of food or famine), it was
profitable to transport food to a place (Cipolla 1954, p. 57). Yet, everyone wanted to do
business in Venice, much more to acquire the fine metal coins of Venice that had become
the most important international currencies of the late Medieval and the early Renaissance
Mediterranean (Bacharach 1994; Stahl 2000; Thiriet 1952).
Venice was prioritising the food security of the metropolis over the food security
of its colonies. This does not mean that they did not have food security policies for the
colonies, but that, in case of emergency, the metropolis had a priority. Moreover, there
is a huge debate whether the grain market was a clearly centrally organised economic
space or whether it was a market the way we perceive it nowadays, upon which the state
imposed limitations to make sure that both food security and market competition were
ensured (Gasparis 1991, 1994; Gryntakis 2003a; Papadia-Lala 2003; Moody and Oliver 2004,
pp. 103–12; Tsougarakis 1990). Even in the second case, the other state policies (monetary
policy and taxation) were enough to affect the grain market, production and consumption,
or export decisions of both the colonial locals and the people and the authorities in the
metropolis.
In particular, the analysis of the grain rules and practices in Venetian Crete done by
Tsougarakis (1990) shows that grain production and market allocation were much more
complicated than one could anticipate. The Venetian authorities established a detailed
system of monitoring the grain production and of gathering information about the produc-
tion and the quantities of grain on the island of Crete. In that way, the rulers could make
decisions based on actual situations and be able to implement them, at least at the level of
administration.
To that, one should add the grain warehouses that were state-managed and various
officers who were assigned to check and weigh the grains as well as the wheat flour that
was offered to the market or to the state warehouses. The officers were members of a state
network of monitoring that could have employees both in cities and in the countryside.
That is, the Venetian administration was organised so that they could have an accurate
picture of the grain production and they could disseminate the policies and the orders of
the Venetian officers to the various regions of the island. The power of the Venetian officers
with reference to the grain production was also leading to power abuses at the expense of
the producers, in particular the low status local producers.
However, we do not have any cumulative calculation by the Venetian authorities
concerning the total grain production of Crete. Tsougarakis (1990, pp. 349–50) analyses
the various sources that mention quantities of grain, but he, too, has to differentiate that
grain in Crete means wheat and other grain staples. Moreover, the contracts of trade do not
show the whole volume of production but the grain that takes the commercial route within
the island or towards Venice. It is indicative that, in 1330, Venice negotiated the purchase
of 100,000 mouzouria (µoυζoύρια) produced by Chania producers and landowners. One
mouzouri equals 17,089 litres (or fifteen oka(de)s (oκάδες), where one oka is equal to
1282 kg). Therefore, at that time, Venice was buying 1,708,900 litres of wheat. Tsougarakis
(1990) states that this must have been one third of the total production of the region of
Chania (one of the major cities and districts of Crete), which was 5,126,700 litres, according
to the same calculation.
The market seems to have been supported to work more or less competitively, and
only when there was a shortage or a price increase (or a price sinking), the authorities
intervened to support the customers or even the grain producers. This analysis fits the
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hypothesis that the economic structures, particularly monetary and taxations systems,
affected the decisions of the producers. It would not be otherwise, if one takes into account
that Venetian authorities try to turn producers to grain cultivation and they fail. They could
not fail if it was a completely state-directed market, but it likely was not. The failure of the
Venetian interventions for grain production can be explained only if there was a market
more or less working, even under control or supervision/intervention of the Venetian state.
This contributed to the harsh policy of Venice against the rebels of the island, which
were the communities that were living in or around the highland plains of Crete that
could be the most efficient lands to produce grain of good quality in adequate quantities.
Venetian authorities insisted for many decades that the plains were not cultivated, thus the
local communities lost their food security and, with this, their possibility for revolt and
political autonomy. In other words, Venetian authorities needed grain for Venice and for
Crete, but they preferred not to have it if the grain was to be produced by the rebels of
the highlands. Nevertheless, despite the suppression of the rebels and their attempts to
cultivate even illegally, Venetian authorities had, at some point, when grain cultivation was
an imminent need, to waive the prohibition (Detorakis 1994, pp. 198–201; Gasparis 1994,
pp. 13–33, 50–55; Gryntakis 2003a; Moody and Oliver 2004, pp. 131–32).
Here, one should note that the riots and the rebellions against the Venetian rulers were
taking place rather regularly. Tsougarakis (1990) gives a list of major events that could
have affected the political situation but also the food production in Crete for the 13–14th
centuries. Cretans therefore revolted in 1211 (immediately after the Venetians won the war
with the Genoese for the rule of Crete), 1217–1219, 1222–1223, 1230–1236, (possibly in 1252),
1261, 1262–1265, 1266–1271, 1272–1278, 1278–1282, 1283–1299, 1319, 1333, 1341–1347, and
1363–1365. Apart from the revolts, plague epidemics, earthquakes, or wars with invasions
by Genoese or Turkish armies were events that possibly affected the production and/or
access to grain.
Another policy instrument that Venetian authorities used to make sure that there was
some grain production was to use the debts of the producers (mostly feudal lords who,
on their turn, transferred their burdens to their serfs) in terms of taxation to force them to
produce grain at regulated prices, sometimes at prices that were equal to or better than
the market prices on the island. After all, prices for Cretan grain in Venice were always
much higher than those on the island (Tsougarakis 1990). Taxation debts then were binding
producers to grain production. The taxation debts were also educating the producers and
the entire island that, in order to avoid debt to Venetian authorities, people needed to
acquire the high value currencies needed or vast amounts of the low value currencies at a
non-favourable exchange rate to the high-value currencies used to account for the payment
of taxes.
6. The Hypothesis: A Monetary and Taxation System against Food Security
From the above, it is obvious that the Venetian authorities were defeated in their
effort to increase adequately the grain production in their colony of Crete. One would
also hypothesise that the defeat had some deep structural causes, because, when wine
trade stopped being profitable for Cretan producers and Venetian traders, they turned
to production and trade of oil for soap production instead of grain. When Ottomans
undertook the rule of the island, the trend continued as before. It must not be a coincidence
that the monetary system of the Ottoman Crete and the Ottoman Empire was similar to
that of Venice (Detorakis 1994, pp. 192–93, 258–68; Stallsmith 2007; Liata 1996).
I mentioned in Section 2 that the insistence of Cretans and the Venetian settlers not to
cultivate enough grain, even when they could see that their food security was undermined,
is not easily explained. One does not need to know the reason for one’s lack of grain to
think or to try to cultivate more in a case where the climate is not bad for this cultivation.
Additionally, one does not need to use the climate excuse once one also cultivates vast fields
of vineyards for wine, although the climate is not very favourable for this cultivation either.
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The explanation of the profit made through international trade of wine that was
flourishing in Crete during most of the centuries that Venice had the rule of the island
is not enough either. Even if grain was not profitable or was not profitable enough, is a
strong profit motive necessary for self-preservation? In terms of individual, household,
and collective survival, people would have also chosen to cultivate for their own use and
food security instead of turning to export monoculture of a cultivation (vineyard, wine)
that, in times of food shortages, could not be used as an alternative staple.
At this point, we come to the discussion of monetary and taxation frameworks I
presented in Sections 3 and 4. It is probable that the monetary and the taxation systems
that the Venetians imposed on Crete were obliging people, whether they were locals or
settlers, to search for white money, i.e., highly valued, precious metal-containing currencies
(Drakakis and Kleanthis 2004; Mueller 1980). In other words, if the taxation system
exercised pressure over the producers to pay taxes in white money, people were forced
to search for silver grossi and golden ducati and perhaps for other (foreign) currencies
containing precious metals that were accepted for tax payments by the authorities. If those
currencies could not be found, then they would have had to search for ever-increasing
amounts of low value currencies that would be calculated at their (unfavourable) exchange
rate with the white money currencies.
The monetary segregation mentioned in Sections 3 and 4 makes things even more
difficult. First, white money was of high value and was used in trade or in payments
for high-skilled labour. Most of the Cretans, however, were not allowed to participate
in overseas trade (allowed only to Venetian nobles), or, even if they were, it was only by
exception and after struggles and various bypassing of the law (Apellaniz 2013). Second,
from the structure of the monetary system itself, it seems that the wealthiest people, usually
the urban wealthy, might have had access to white money. Rural areas had no easy access
to white money, therefore, they had to transact with low value currencies, turn to barter,
and, at the end of the day, face devaluation of their produce through the calculation of its
value in low value black money (Drakakis and Kleanthis 2004; Mueller 1980). However,
we need to point out that, once the Venetians took hold of the island and sent Venetian
settlers there, many good productive lands were grabbed by the settlers at the expense of
the locals. The locals, especially if they were not of noble descent, ended up working for
the new landowners or struggling to survive on less productive lands and politically were
stripped of most official decision-making powers (Gasparis 2008; Labrinos 2002; Labrinos
2012; Maltezou 2000).
It was not only the profit that was not great in grain production. It was also that
work by food producers was devaluated again and again, as it was represented in low
value currencies, while the traded goods were represented in white money (high value
currencies) (Stahl 1985, 2000, pp. 41–98, 201–25; 2007; Mueller 1980). It was easier, therefore,
to turn to non-regulated or less-regulated sectors, such as wine trade, to acquire better
income and, with it, the white money they all needed. Therefore, seeking white money was
not only for taxation but also for avoiding as much as possible the representation of their
labour or produce in low value currency that was constantly losing value in comparison to
fine silver and golden coins.
This is the framework within which the Venetian authorities wanted or even forced
the Cretan people to cultivate grain, but it was to no avail. Authors explain the denial of
people with their propensity to search for high profits or with the revolutionary untamed
character of Cretan communities (Stallsmith 2007; Moody and Oliver 2004, pp. 103–18,
190–96). However, the crucial question is how the cultivators themselves endangered their
own survival after repeated food shortages and insisted on cultivating wine and sugar
or producing dairy products (mostly cheese) for export. That is, what makes an island
with adequate (but not always enough quantities for export) grain production resources
divert their agriculture to export trade of luxuries such as malmsey wine? Why would
Cretans endanger their own survival to rely on imports for food they could produce
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themselves, especially in times of high political/military instability in the Mediterranean
that endangered the import of grain from hostile lands?
My hypothesis is that they were forced to. The liquidity shortages and the tax system
imposed on the island made everyone, particularly those involved in agriculture, seek white
money, which was available in export sectors rather than local production or regulated
sectors/state oligopolies such as grain trade. The trade-off between land production and
high value money pursuit was eventually a choice, even for the landowners in the mainland
around Venice (Spufford 1988, pp. 240–64). Moreover, the devaluation of the low value
coins that were used by most people who were not traders or highly skilled workers or
crafters meant that everyone’s labour was devalued through the floating exchange rates
among the various currencies that circulated on the island. It was not that the profit
from wine was better, it was that the cultivation for subsistence was the worst option for
producers. The monetary and the taxation systems made sure that subsistence production
was not sustaining subsistence. Subsistence production, therefore, was not achieving its
main aim (survival) because of monetary and taxation systems.
As a consequence, the entire island was forced into the highly risky export trade and
production with monoculture (initially wine, then oil for soap workshops) to ensure that
labour was compensated as well as possible and that subsistence was supported through
trade by using the white money acquired through exporting high value goods when exports
and imports were possible. I write, “when exports and imports were possible” because
the export-led agriculture was a very unstable and risky enterprise in general. A war in
Anatolia (now Turkey) was cutting off the links for grain imports to Crete. A change in
wine preservation technology was making the malmsey wine out of fashion in Western
Europe (Stallsmith 2007). An unpredictable change of weather could cause the monoculture
harvest of one year to be destroyed in one single day.
We also need to comment that the perception of sustainability in financial systems
was not existent at the time and that, even if the care for the landscape and for the people
living in the landscape was there, it was not connected to the monetary system as it
is today (Popescu and Popescu 2019). Yet, even if the producers and the businesses of
the era wanted to be more sustainable and responsible to their communities who were
in permanent risk of starvation, they were not given that chance due to the Venetian
state policies.
In other words, the otherwise risky and self-defeating choices of the Cretans concern-
ing their food security during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance were forced upon
them by monetary and taxation systems that the Venetians imposed on the island. The
persistence of food shortages was the result of the choices made by the Venetian colonisers
who wanted to acquire wealth from their colony through all their policies: their prohibition
of cultivation in the rebel plains to crash the anticolonial resistance; their monetary system
that was bringing huge profits to Venice and Venetian elites; their taxation system, which
was designed against their subjects; their trade policy, which favoured the wealthiest
among the dwellers of Crete and the metropolis over the colonies; their grain policy, which
aimed at reducing any attempt of the colonies to ask for better prices or for more political
independence; and their agricultural policy, which was based on the devalued labour of
serfs and peasants, including slave labour (Gasparis 1994; Tsougarakis 1990).
Obviously, Venice could not have it all, and their attempt to ensure adequate grain
production failed because their policies were contradictory, or, the Venetian policies were
self-defeating, at least in terms of macro-economic policy and collective political economy,
because, in terms of individual traders and of the metropolis, it worked perfectly well in
favour of wealth transfer from the colonies to the metropolitan centre.
To that, one should add the liquidity problems that this very same economic system
was creating, leading to an expansion of debt in Crete that affected all social classes. It
seems that the state itself was creating the debts by instituting a monetary system that
had not enough quantities of the white money they required to have the taxes paid in this
currency and not in low value coins (Gofas Dimitrios, 1993; Kalitsounakis 1928; Mueller
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1980). Nevertheless, it was not only the monetary system; many predatory loans with very
high interest rates were hidden under feudal or non-monetary loans, a strategy that seems
to have been very easy to use in favour of local lords or even monasteries who, in this
manner, were avoiding the stigma and the legislation against usury (Gryntakis 2000, 2003b;
Xanthoudides 1912; Sotiropoulou 2018b).
The adoption of legislation to protect or relieve the debtors did not help much. Many
were leaving the island, and many others were losing everything because of their debts.
Legislating the mitigation of the debt obligations did not bring the expected positive results.
On the other hand, the Venetian state was a major debtor itself. It did not usually pay its
debts to its lenders (particularly when it took obligatory loans in times of emergency). In
many cases, it had to borrow capital from lenders at prices that were little by little draining
the public treasury from liquidity and creditworthiness. The lenders of the Venetian state
were various, one category being the nobility and the noble bankers and traders who, even
if they knew they would never take their money back, would acquire political leverage
in terms of decision making in the state institutions. Other lenders were citizens of lesser
status but who were also willing to lend the Venetian state not for the income this might
have bring them (because the income might never come) but for the political prestige
and status this might give them. In other cases, especially when it was about obligatory
loans, the creditors were people who had no decision-making powers and who were, in
reality, heavily taxed through the obligatory loans without expecting to get anything back,
either in money or in political power (Tucci 1981, 2001; Gofas Dimitrios; Tsiknakis 2003;
Hocquet 1979).
As if the monetary and the tax structures were not regressive enough, the food
production choices were made under such harsh financial conditions. After the 14th century,
indebtedness became endemic and almost pandemic in Venetian Crete. Prohibition of usury
and the reduction of interest rates by law did not help much either (Thiriet 1985; Tucci 2001;
Gryntakis 2000, 2003a; Ploumidis 1972; Drakakis and Kleanthis 2004). Overseas trade and
the possibility of acquiring white money currencies were, therefore, practically obligatory.
It was as if the monetary system had created various walls here and there to make people
go to one direction of production only—that of exports of mostly luxury goods.
The economic situation in the island of Crete as a colony of Venice and the problems it
was facing due to the monetary policies of the metropolis can be compared to the situation
of monetary instability and dependence created between countries of Western Europe and
their colonies. Although such a comparison goes beyond the scope of this paper, we need
to comment that the metropolis has only as much interest in the economic welfare of the
colony as benefits the capitalist or trade centres in the metropolitan areas. In that way,
the monetary system of the colonies is designed to make the metropolitan currency be
“valuable” in the colony, while the local currency is both of low value and “expensive” to
use. In that way, the economy of the colony is connected to the metropolitan economy,
apart from other colonial methods, through a connection of monetary subordination. The
colonial monetary systems also seem to challenge the quantity theory of money because
the existence of multiple currencies in an economy does not secure that the supplies of
money and monetary liquidity are adequate for the local economy to function properly
(Earle 1954; Ferguson 1953; Hazelwood 1954; Hopkins 1970; Katz 1956; Prebisch 1959;
Smith 1985).
A similar discussion could be opened when one would like to compare the monetary
system of Venice as experienced in Crete island with monetary policies adopted by the
European Union through the institutions of the Eurozone. This comparison would need
even more research and careful consideration, given that one aspect is the debate about
neo-colonialism in the European Union and another aspect is the actual monetary structure
of the Eurozone, where the official currency is the euro only, and where other currencies
are not legal tender but are used locally with a limited purchasing power. Nevertheless,
one should bear in mind that, as this paper showed, complex monetary systems that reflect
unequal access to currencies and unequal decision-making power concerning monetary
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issues tend to create positive feedback loops where those who control the valuable currency
are at advantaged position to accumulate even more valuable currency and wealth reflected
in other assets too (Lucarelli and Gaetano 2020; Lucarelli and Gobbi 2016; Mikelis 2016;
Yeros and Praveen 2020).
7. Conclusions and Directions for Further Research
We do not know whether the Venetian authorities were aware that their entire eco-
nomic system, basically their commercial feudal system with monetary and taxation rules
such as they were, was the cause or could have been the major cause for people in Crete to
refuse to cultivate grain despite the fact that they needed it. We know that they were aware
that their monetary system was not working for the favour of everyone in the economy and
that it was favouring the social groups that had access to decision-making or had enough
power and financial means to lobby to decision-makers. That is, nobles and wealthy people
(who were identical with traders and bankers) were making monetary and taxation rules,
and they had no incentive to make the rules against themselves and their interests (Mueller
1980; Apellaniz 2013).
By “interests”, I mean, here, the individual interests and the interests of the nobles
or the merchants as a class. As Hocquet (1979) points out, some of the members of their
class may have been harmed (as was happening with the Venetian and the Cretan nobles of
Crete that had to face the metropolitan policies and sometimes revolt against metropolitan
rulers), but the class as a whole was better off, even if the economy or the society as a
whole was not. That the economic rules of Venice were contradictory among themselves,
therefore, was a policy. From some point onwards, the pursuit of certain individual and
class interests was enough a conscious decision to erase concerns about other policies that
could be beneficial for everyone.
In addition, that the basic survival of many was endangered because the Venetian
nobles insisted in having a very regressive monetary and taxation policy was not likely
perceived as such. Overseas trade, towards which the entire island economy was diverted,
was very profitable for the traders. The traders were the wealthy class who, in times of
emergency, were the least likely not to be able to buy food, even at a high price. In other
words, the food production was subsidising the international trade, just as was happening
with salt production and trade, which was used to mitigate the costs of luxury goods
that brought the biggest profit to Venetian merchants (Hocquet 1979). Wine was the same
thing—a luxury good for the ascending Western European markets that was subsidised
by the food producers, who had to choose between either receiving very low income
or changing cultivation in order to survive and/or avoid debts to individuals or to the
state, and by consumers, who saw the grain prices rise constantly after the 14th century
(Tsougarakis 1990; Tsiknakis 2005).
More research is needed to examine in detail how the monetary system and the
changes in the monetary practices throughout centuries were affecting food production in
Crete but also in other Venetian colonies. Environmental history is mostly needed to make
sure that undocumented practices reflected on landscapes are taken into account and that
documented practices are put into their integrated environmental and agricultural context.
For example, it is very important to find more information about the quantities of the food
produced, and this, if the written sources are not enough, can also be investigated as part
of the environmental history. More investigation is also needed to explore how each social
group was experiencing, on the one hand, the food security problems, and on the other
hand, the pressures to work in the export sectors instead of producing for subsistence of
themselves and their communities. Finally, in terms of economic policy and food security
implications, the case of Venetian Crete needs to be further researched, because it seems
that monetary structures affect heavily decisions about production and provision of food.
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